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ABSTRACT 
EU membership has become the primary goal for CEECs and the 
prospect of their eventual integration has already been taken into account 
by the European Council. In this context, the paper presents the 
substantial progress made on the macroeconomic stabilization as well as on 
the microliberalization and the institutional restructuring of the financial 
system. Against this background, the paper considers the challenges 
faced by CEECs' financial systems in the preparation for EU integration. 
Two key areas of pressure on fiscal and monetary prudence exist: 
substantial overhang of banking sector liquidity and incomplete 
transformation of inherited social programs. Also, it is still too soon even 
for those countries more advanced in the process of stabilization to lose 
autonomy in the management of exchange rate policy. As a consequence, 
transition to participation in monetary union may take a long time and 
when it happens cannot be but gradual because of the different 
development of the potential member countries. 
"It .U8t be r�racl that there i. nothing �8 difficult to pl4n • .ara doubtful of .ucc..a. liar 
.:Jr8 &lngeroua to .anaqe than the creation of a n_ .YS�. Por the 1111 tiator "- the -r of all 
who would pnlf1t by tba preMrVat10n of U. old i�t1tut1C1ru1 and �y luJt_ua dafaacknl ia tboee 
who llhould gain by the n_ ones" 
Maqu1avelli 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: TOWARDS 
INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic changes in Europe which began with the removal of the 
Berlin wall in 1989 have clearly had an impact on the geographic and 
economic balance of the European Union (EU). Association agreementsl 
with some central and eastern european countries and membership 
acceptance of former European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries seem 
to have shifted this balance more towards the east and the north of 
Europe. On the other hand, those changes are taking place when Western 
European countries are facing historical challenges in the process of 
deepening their economic and political relations via a closer integration. 
Although, at present, it does not seem clear the exact extent and 
direction of the political and economic implications of the transformation 
process in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), no doubt 
exists that it will definitively have an impact on the changes expected to 
shape the future of Europe. 
1 Agreements aimed to further the integration by lowering barriers to 
trade, establishing a framework for political dialogue, harmonizing legislation, 
cooperating on science and technology, and providing for technical cooperation. 
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The potential effects of integration of western Europe on the rapid 
opening of CEECs are expected to change dramatically global economic, 
political, and cultural relations. At the same time, wide consensus exists 
that the removal of trade, monetary and technical barriers within Europe 
and the liberalization of the economies of CEECs create challenges and 
opportunities from the policy making as well as private investment view 
point. 
In light of the desire of CEECs for EU membership, this paper presents 
in a non technical manner the major challenges which the CEECs already 
face in transforming their financial systems to those consistent with 
market oriented ones. These challenges, of course, should be viewed in 
the wider context of the full scale economic reforms which these countries 
are undertaking. Although many issues are common to all CEECs, it has 
been my goal in writing this paper to focus on those countries which have 
made the most progress with their stabilization and structural reforms: 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and 
the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. At the same time, 
these CEECs have signed trade agreements with the EU aimed to further 
their integration, and have applied for EU membership or are in the 
process of doing so (Bulgaria and Lithuania). The prospect of eventual 
EU membership of the CEECs has been made explicit ill 1993 at the 
Copenhagen summit of the European Council if and when certain basic 
political and economic criteria are fulfilled. The Essen summit in December 
1994 and the Madrid Summit in December 1995 were already taking future 
enlargement eastward of the EU into account; the question had become 
when and how, rather than whether, the CEECs would achieve 
membership. 
The four chapters of this paper start with the discussion of the 
concept of transition and, in this context, it presents some aspects of 
their progress in macroestabilization and the associated challenges given 
their potential effects on their financial system. Here, the paper 
considers the challenges faced with the introduction of indirect monetary 
policy instruments as well as the different exchange rate arrangements in 
CEECs. Against this background, progress in microeconomic liberalization 
and institutional restructuring is evaluated. Along those lines, the paper 
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presents the major challenges CEECs' financial systems (banks and 
markets) face ahead of the transition process. 
Against this backdrop, the last chapter focuses on convergence issues: 
challenges faced by CEECs's policy makers in preparation for EU 
integration on the macro as well as the micro level. 
2. TRANSITION ECONOMIES: FROM CENTRAL PLANNING TO 
ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS WITH THE EU 
The concept of transition can be broken down into three subsidiary 
concepts for analytical purposes2 to describe the subordinate processes 
associated with transition (Balcerowicz,1993): Macroeconomic 
stabilization, microeconomic liberalisation and fundamental institutional 
restructuring. 
Macroeconomic estabilization is the realm where more literature and 
more important experience existed and where international organizations 
had developed a large experience before the fall of the Berlin wall. 
Nevertheless, CEECs have shown three distinct characteristics from other 
stabllization processes (Blanchard et al. , 1991): Firstly, pre-stabllization 
distortions in prices were much larger and widespread, and had been 
present for much longer; secondly, production and incentive structures 
were radically different from those of a market economy; and thirdly, the 
combination of money growth and partially fixed prices led in some 
countries to a combination of rationing and inflation. 
Other important aspects of transition relate to microeconomic 
liberalisation and institutional restructuring. Both taken together can be 
called systemic u,msfOl'llllltiOD that encompasses the creation of markets, 
including financial markets, the institution and enforcement of a legal 
framework, and enterprise privatization and restructuring. In general, 
, Although some authors (K. Bartholdy) disagree in this methodological 
classification arguing that transition concerns structural reform only since 
stabllisation has not been an equally great challenge in all countries. 
-7-
any macroeconomic policy needs to be supported by adequate 
microeconomic conditions in order to be fully effective because of this 
duality between the two: microeconomic structures affect macroeconomic 
performance, and macroeconomic policies have microeconomic 
consequences. For example, macroeconomic shocks, particularly, but not 
only, in the monetary realm tend to cause stress on banks balance sheets 
(IMF, SM\96\40). 
Against this background, the issue of maximum speed hss been long 
and vehemently discussed by many economists who either defend or 
oppose the virtues of gradua1lst versus big bang strategies in the 
transition process3• It should be understood that maximum speed is not 
always the optimal one and, moreover, that the design and sequencing is 
at least as important. According to Balcerowicz (1993), "what determines 
the maximum speed of a process of institutional or economic change is 
ultimately the inherent human limitations of information processing and 
learning. 11 Thus, the financial sector, as distinct, for example t from 
agriculture, is a knowledge-intensive industry. As a consequence, 
changes in the regulatory framework and in the structure of incentive are 
not enough to bring about a radical change in behaviour. From a broader 
prospective, this issue of maximum speed is closely related to the 
differences in the speed of economic and institutional chsnges. In this 
context, the speed of macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic 
liberalisation is much higher than that of changing existing institutions 
or creating new ones. 
2.1. Progress on the macroeconomic stabi1ization: challenges and Impact 
on the financial sector 
The countries that started earliest with stabilization and structural 
reforms hsve made considerable progress with disinflation (Table 1). This 
has been the case of Poland and Slovenia; both initiated their market­
oriented reforms during the 1980s. By 1993, Poland hsd reduced its 
3 However, in some instances (Poland) , the discussion often refers exclusively 
to stabilization. 
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Tabla 1: CEEC, Selected Economic IndIcators. 1989-95 
'N' ,- ,., I , .. I , .. I 
Real GDP .... ...u. 
I .. lvari• -0.5 -9.1 -11.1 '1.3 -2." 
Caecllo.lav.U. ... -o." -15.' -1.5 
Clech ",,\!bUc -0.1 
Hun'l.r}' .. , -1.5 -11.9 -].0 -0.1 
Polan<l ... -11.6 -7.e ... u 
JI..."t. -5.1 -5.6 - la.9 -1.1 ... 
alav.k bpllbl1c • ... 1 
alov.nl. .., 
a.tenia -1.' -21.6 -l." 
Li t.J" .... i. -13.1 -56.6 -2".2 
LatY1. -11.1 -H.2 -16. 1 
Inflation I'8tea (Perlod av ........ ) 
11I1vari• ... n.' ]]1.5 12.0 72.1 
Czecl'loollovaU. ... 10.8 5'.0 11.0 
Caech Jlepubli e 20.8 
Bunvar}' 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 
Pol ... 4 251.1 585.8 10.3 ".0 35.3 
-,. ... .. , 161.1 210.1 256.0 
Slav.k JIep\!bUc 61.2 10.0 23.2 
'lov.n1. 12.1 
In ... l. 210.6 1061.0 ".0 
Li tll .. anl. 2H.l 1020.5 no.' 
Latvia 12"." ,,1.] 109.0 
Fiscal balance (In DOrc8n' of GDP) 
.ul'l.d. (1) -l." -la.l 
Cncllo.lav.kl. -).1 -o., 
Cncll JIep\ltl 1c (2) 
Hun9&l}' (JI -1.3 ... 
'Oled!') -l." .. , 
-..ia(l,21 ... . .. 
110 ... k 1tep\Il:I11c 
Il0Yen1. (b) 
I.tenia (b) 
Llthll ... ia (b) 
Latvl. (.) 
1I000rc:el IMP, liorld 100llOll1c Ou tlook, OCDI 
(.) 1995 Data .no ent-t.ea 
-]5.1 -u., -18.5 
-2.0 -1.6 
... 
-2.5 -'.0 -6.' 
-6.5 -1.6 -2.11 
... " .6 -0.1 
-ll.l -1.5 
... ... • •• 
... -0.1 -0.1 
-0.1 
... -o., ... 
(b) 
, •. I 19!115(.) 
... . .. 
••• . .. 
... U 
... . .. 
, .. . .. 
... , .. 
... . .. 
... ... 
.. , ... 
... . .. 
16.0 62.1 
10.0 .. , 
11.8 28.2 
32.2 27.' 
D6.' 12.3 
n." ... 
11.' 12.1 
.,., 21.2 
12.1 36.5 
35.1 25.0 
-5.6 -6.5 
'1.3 -1.6 
-1.6 -6.1 
-2.0 -2.1 
-2.5 -2.5 
-1.1 -o." 
-0.2 -0.5 
, .. ... 
'2.0 -1.3 
-4.0 -l." 
(b) P'or 11115.114 111161 Total r ... anua .nc1 'lr ... u a.1n ... total aKpan<l1 t ..... (ineludin'iJ extra bUCI9&U tW'l.s. pIlO. !lit 1_1D'iJ 
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inflation rate slgnificantly. Followlng the dissolutlon of the former 
Yugoslavia, Slovenla succeeded In rapidly reduclng Inflatlon to nearly 12 
percent per annum by end of 1995. 
Although In Hungary market reforms were gradually introduced in the 
late 1960s, the pace of reform only accelerated in the early 1990s when 
prices were freed, the currency W8S devalued and subsidies were 
reduced. As a resutt of these measures, annual inflation rates increased 
to 35 percent per annum in 1991 and still, as of 1995, the results of the 
fight against inflation were mixed. The case of the former Czechoslovakia 
was that of a prudently and tlghtly controlled economy when a bold market 
oriented reform program was launched in early 1991. This ambitious 
program was consistent with the continuation of stable macroeconomic 
pollcies. Agalnst this background, and des pite the break-up of the 
country In 1992-93, the Czech and Slovak Republlcs are among the more 
advanced and well-managed transition economies. 
Bulgaria and Romania were suffering from large Inherlted macroeconomic 
1mbalances at the start of their reform programs in early 1991. Prices were 
tlghtly controlled In splte of rlslng demand and decllnlng output, so that 
when prices were freed, annual inflation rates peaked at 333 pereent and 
161 pereent, respectively. However, stabilization programs have been 
reasonably successful in maintaining certain price stability and in 
bringing down infIation. 
Among the BaItic Republlcs, Estonia ploneered the reform process In 
1989. Latvia and Lithuania were relative late starters, embarking on a 
comprehensive reform program in mid-1992 when all three economies were 
shaken by the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Perhaps the most 
drastic measure that facilitated the stabilization effort in these countries 
was a currency reformo Estonia and Lithuarua introduced currency boards 
in mid-1992 and 1994 respectively. Notwithstanding, Estonia and Latvia 
have been more successful in reducing inflation while inflation remains 
relatively high in Lithuania. 
Tight fiscal pollcies (Table 2) are playing an important role in 
aUeviating the burden on monetary pollcy (Czech Republlc, Estonia and 
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Table 2: CEEC: General Government Budget Balance1 
(In percent of GDP) 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary2 
Latvia2 
Lithuania2 
Poland 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
1989 
... 
... 
-1.3 
... 
. . . 
-8.0 
. .. 
... 
1990 
... 
· . .  
0.9 
· . .  
· . .  
3.3 
· . .  
· . .  
1991 
. .. 
5.2 
-3.0 
6.3 
. . . 
-6.7 
... 
2.6 
1992 
-2.2 
-0.3 
-6.8 
-0.8 
... 
-8.0 
-11.9 
0.2 
Source: IMF J World Economic Outlook J 1996 
1993 1994 
0.6 -1.3 
-0.7 1.3 
-6.7 -8.6 
0.6 -4.0 
-0.1 -2.0 
-4.0 -2.0 
-7.1 -1.3 
0.3 -0.2 
1995(a) 
-1.6 
0.3 
-6.7 
-3.4 
-1.3 
-2.7 
-0.4 
-0.5 
Defined as total revenue and grants minus total expenditure 
(including extrabudgetary funds) plus net lending. 
Central government balance. 
(a) Estimates. 
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Lithuania) in the fight against inflation and in streghthening domestic 
savings which, in turn, are essential to sustain the pickup in investment 
to rebuild largely obsolete capital stocks inherited from the command 
system. However, progress in bringing down inflation has been slower 
than envisaged sometimes because of monetization of the fiscal (or quasi 
fiscal) deficit (Hungary) and excess credit provision to public enterprises 
(Romania and the Slovak Repu.blic). Also, backward-looking indexation 
mechanisms have contributed to the inflation inertia (Bulgaria and 
Romania) . 
Large capital inflows from industrial countries have been one of the 
main challenges associated with relatively successful stabilization in 
CEECs. The inflows of foreign capital have increasingly been used to 
finance growing current account deficits which mainly reflect increases 
in private consumption rather than investment. Appreciation of the real 
exchange rate has been a common consequence of these capital inflows 
(Calvo et aI., 1995). However, in spite of the negative aspects of the 
capital inflows in CEECs, it can also be argued that direct foreign 
investment in the region has not only improved living standards but has 
also fostered the d'evelopment of human capital. 
One major concern associated with this phenomenon has to do with the 
greater financial vulnerability that might be caused by (nonsterilized) 
capital inflows which, as a general rule, will find their way through the 
banking system and will most likely provoke an increase in bank deposits. 
This, in turn, will lead to an expansion in bank credit (unless subject to 
a 100 percent requirement). Banks flooded with liquidity may be prone to 
lend unsafely. Moreover, even if they do not do so, bank credits tend to 
be of a longer maturity than bank deposits. Thus, a large deposit 
withdrawal may generate a liquidity crisis. The probability of a crisis will 
be a function of the stability of funds channelled through the banking 
sector and, of course, of the extent of the deposits\loans maturity 
mismatch (Calvo et aI., 1995). 
Regarding the composition of capital inflows t net external borrowing 
accounts for the largest share. Since 1990, CEECs have received external 
assistance from official creditors and, more recently, some countries such 
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as Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic have raised funds in the 
international capital markets. Foreign direct investment has rapidly 
gained momentum during the 1990s as a consequence of the opening of 
these economies and the massive privatization of state enterprises. This 
has been especially the case in the Czech Republic and Hungary and, to 
a lesser extent in Poland (Table 3.) 
Dollarizationt, a closely related phenomenon to that of capital inflows, 
has been another important challenge to macroeconomic policy in CEECs. 
Foreign currency deposits as a proportion of broad money were between 
30 and 60 percent in 1992-93 (Sahay et ai., 1995) and have been 
increasing rapidly in high inflation environments where trade regimes 
were substantially liberalizeds and where widespread regulations on 
interest rates rendered real returns on alternative saving instruments 
such as domestic-currency assets unattractive. Also J dollarization has 
often signalled the lack of public confidence in the banking system as well 
as fear of confiscation, especially during the first years of the reform 
(Dornbusch et aI., 1989). In fact, dollarization appears to have fallen in 
those transition economies where inflation has been brought under control 
and real interest rates have reached positive levels. This has been the 
case in Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland; in contrast, in Bulgaria and 
Romania where real deposit rates have been negative and often declining, 
dollarization has remained high. 
On the macro level, dollarization may obstruct the ability of policy 
makers to conduct monetary policy effectively. That, other things being 
equal, makes an exchange anchor more desirable. Both aspects are 
analyzed in section 2-1-2. On the micro level, dollarization may have a 
negative impact on the banks' balance sheet that might be brought about 
by deposits denominated in hard currency which are not matched by the 
corresponding assets. The financial vulnerability will be a function of the 
t In general, currency substitution. 
S Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes generally have tighter foreign 
exchange controls. This may explain the low dollarization ratio in Hungary or the 
rapid decline in the dollarization ratio in Poland and Estonia which imposed such 
controls in 1990 and 1992 respectively. 
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size of exposed liabilities and the evolution of the exchange rate. In 
addition, dilution of banks capital denominated in local currency may 
impair the compliance with capital adequacy standards. 
2.1.1. The mix of monetary policy instruments: the transition towards 
indirect tools 
Under the command system, monetary policy reflected state plans so 
that planned direct credit allocation was linked to the planned growth of 
national income. In this. context J credits to enterprises were directly 
allocated through a unitary banking system and risk was socialized 
(Hanousek et a!., 1995). The introduction of a two tier banking system' 
and the issuance of laws granting independence to the central banks 7 of 
any instruction given by the government constituted the new institutional 
framework where these newly created institutions could conduct monetary 
policy. 
At the beginning of the transformation process, the main tools of 
monetary policy were direct instruments, such as bank credit ceilings and 
controlled interest rates. These instruments were attractive to policy 
makers J among other reasons, because of their relatively easy 
implementation; the lack of an institutional framework suitable for market 
based instruments (unsound banking systems, inexistance of money and 
capital markets, inadequate payment systems) j as well as for being a 
useful tool in channelling credit according to specific government goals. 
However, direct tools were difficult to administer and distorted the 
financial systems by hampering competition (credit ceilings) and fostering 
disintermediation and capital flight (interest rate ceilings). 
, As described in section 2-2-1. 
7 However, not fully, for example, the Act of the Czech National Council 
N6/1993 amended by Act No 60/1993 Cl according to which the Czech National 
Bank was created is partly harmonized with the EU law. Exemption- possibility 
to provide with a short term credit up to 5 percent of incomes the national budget 
income. Similarly, the Act No LX of 1991 on the National Bank of Hungary, allows 
for the provission of short term credit (up to a.limit) to the government. 
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Against this background, direct instruments were replaced by indirect 
ones step by step in CEECs with different degrees of success depending 
mainly on: firstly, the soundness of the banking systems; secondly, the 
development of the money market; and thirdly, the institutional strength 
of the central banks. For example, in Poland, reserve requirements8 
were introduced and interest rates were liberalized in 1989, and the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP) specified the refinance and the 
preferential loan rates. In 1991, the NBP introduced auctions of 
repurchase agreements for both NBP and treasury b!1ls as instruments to 
adjust bank liquidity. In 1992, the Czech National Bank (CNB) issued 
bills to decrease the free reserves of commercial banks and at the same 
time required reserves and discount rate policy became the main tools of 
monetary policy. Later, the CNB introduced open market operations with 
treasury bills (Alexander et aI., 1995 and Hanousek et al. " 1995.) As 
of 1993, in both countries) the management of the money supply was 
entirely through indirect tools. In contrast, the Central Bank of Romania 
(CBR) uses, since 1993, direct credits called structural credits which are 
priced below the market rate. As of October 1995, the structural credits 
although decreasing, still accounted for 45 percent of the total balance 
sheet of the CBR. No open market operations existed as of that date 
although there is a primary as well as secondary market of government 
debt (OECD, 1995). Hungary counts with a full set of indirect 
instruments although their application is impeded by the large proportion 
of nonperforming loans (IMF, SM/96/40). 
In CEECs, the introduction of indirect instruments took place in the 
framework of a broader set of reforms, which encompassed liberalization 
of the financial sector (restructuring and privatization of the banking 
sector as well as strengthening and integration of the money markets) j 
macroeconomic stabilization (insulating monetary policy from fiscal deficit 
financing); and liberalization of the economy (freeing interest rates). In 
turn, the development of market based indirect instruments of monetary 
8 Note also that reserve requirements have, in certain cases like Hungary) 
served much as a central planning device than as a monetary policy instrument. 
High reserve requirements were used in the late 1980s and early 1990s to provide 
a pool of finance which the central banks could allocate to the state owned banks. 
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policy has played a catalytic role in developing financial markets in 
general, and money markets in particular. Furthermore, it has 
contributed to increase the efficiency of the banking sector's intermediary 
function (Alexander et aI., 1995). 
However, some aspects of the financial liberalization that accompany the 
shift towards indirect tools of monetary policy have sometimes complicated 
the conduct of monetary policy. The liberalization of interest rates and 
the removal of credit controls destabilizes money or credit aggregates for 
a time, making their control extremely difficult. The opening of the 
capital account which stimulated large capital inflows, reduced 
significantly the authorities' influence over interest rates. Also, interest 
rates and exchange rates become more interdependent with fixed 
exchange regimes typically requiring greater interest rate flexibility. 
The unsoundness of the banking system is one of the major challenges 
faced by the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
whether this is transmitted via credit channels and/or interest rate 
channels (IMF, SM/96/40). In this regard, CEECs have not been an 
exception at least in some stage of their transformation. Problem banks 
often have shortfalls in required reserves that impair the control over the 
supply of money and credit by the central bank (Latvia). Also, money 
market segmentation is often the result of unsound banks tapping these 
markets (Hungary). It has impeded the development of these markets as 
well as limited the authorities' ability to implement monetary policy 
efficiently. Furthermore, adverse selection and moral hazard issues may 
arise since unsound banks are willing to borrow at any price and no limit 
to avoid illiquidity. 
2.1.2. Exchange rate policies In the context of external sector 
developments 
The evolution of the cross-border trade in CEECs had a turning point 
in the beginning of the 1990s not only as a result of drastically shrinking 
trade among the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 
partners and among the former Soviet Union, but also as the result of 
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reorientation of the trade flows of these countries towards the Western 
market economies. This cross border trade was also influenced by the 
adverse terms of trade stemming mainly from market-determined raw 
material prices and exports of capital goods that could not hold their own 
in hard currency trade, as well as because of the political and economic 
uncertainties. In the course of the past three years, the share of trade 
with former CMEA economies has declined significantly while trade with 
western Europe has expanded· dynamically. In this context, deficits 
narrowed significantly (Richter, 1996). 
Trade policy reform in CEECs has been swift in dismantling explicit 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and in introducing liberal 
tariff regimes. Thus, import regimes, in general, have become highly 
liberal by international standards while, on the export side, the situation 
tends to be more restrictive although varies among CEECs. Only under 
particular circumstances, countries such as Poland partially reconsidered 
their tariff regimes and quotas, resulting in (limited) reintroduction of 
import protection9• One of the main features of existing trade laws on the 
import side is the considerable amount of discretion they leave to the 
authorities. In fact, no country of the region except for the Czech and 
Slovak Republics is fully subject to GATT disciplines (EBRD, 1994). All 
CEECs referred in this paper have entered in some sort of trade 
agreements with the EU. Such agreements are aimed at furthering their 
integration by lowering barriers to trade10 and by establishing a 
framework for cooperation (EBRD, 1994 and 1995). 
, The Estonian authorities have proposed meassures aimed at eliminating 
virtually all remaining elements of trade taxation in the 1996 Budget. In contrast, 
in Poland, after the liberalization and the tariff suspensions in 1990, its average 
tariff fell from 18.3 to 5. 5 per cent. In the first half of 1991, however, after the 
Zloty had appreciated significantly against other currencies, the government 
raised the average tariff to 16 per cent. In autumn 1991, further tariff revisions 
took place, and early in 1992 all tariff suspensions were ended and average 
weighted tariffs rose. 
10 The agreements establish a free trade of industrial products over 10 years 
with the EU countries reducing, in general, protectionist meassures at a faster 
pace than their east European counterparts. 
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Against this background of trade reforms, Poland and, later, Hungary, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics and the Baltics moved rather quickly 
toward current account convertibility, taking a major step forward in 
integrating their economies into the international economic system. Also 
the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungaryll are taking major steps in 
introducing capital account convertibility. This move towards 
convertibility has been largely motivated by the expectation of significant 
private capital inflows and, more precisely, of private foreign direct 
investment and its associated benefits. 
Thus, the remarkable improvement in the capital account of CEECs 
(Table 4) mostly reflects a reversal in external borrowing beginning in 
1992. In some cases, like Hungary and in the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
this has acquired important proportions. Notwithstanding, in a context 
of increasingly internationalized capital markets, the role of external 
factors such as low international interest rates and recessionary 
conditions in industrial countries cannot be underestimated in analysing 
capital flows in the CEECs. That was the case in late 1993 when Western 
investors poured money into emerging markets (Shadier et al. , 1993). 
One of the most significant developments in CEECs has been the rapid 
growth of net portfolio (bonds and equity) flows, which have become an 
important source of financing for certain countries like the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. More precisely, bond issuance in international capital 
markets has turned out to be an important avenue of external financing, 
with Hungary being the largest sovereign borrower12 among the CEECs. 
11 This liberalisation aims to facilitate these countries' entry into the DECD. 
By virtue of it, their citizens and companies can transfer foreign currency to 
OECD countries to buy a minimum percentage of a foreign company's shares or 
purchase property abroad for economic activity. At the same time, foreigners can 
sell securities (or investment fund units) with a maturity of longer than a year, 
after obtaining permission from the Securities Comission, up to certain amount 
per year. 
12 The Czech and Slovak Republics as well as Poland and Hungary have credit 
ratings by investors services. 
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1987-91 
1992-93 
1987-91 
1992-93 
1988-91 
1992-93 
1988-91 
1992-93 
Bulgaria 
-4.0 
-8.5 
Table 4: CEEC: Exterual Sector 
Indicators, 1987-93 
Czech Hungary Poland 
Republicl 
Romania 
Cal!ital Account Balance {In �rcent of GDP) 
-0.5 2.1 -5.2 -2.0 
4.5 9.3 1.1 6.8 
Slovak 
Republicl 
-0.5 
1.3 
Capital Account. Net Direct Investment (In percent of GDP) 
0.2 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 
0.5 2.7 5.6 0.5 0.3 -0.6 
Cumulative Net Official Borrowin2: (In USD billions) 
1.0 0.7 2.5 3.9 -2.7 0.7 
1.4 0.2 0.1 -1.1 2.8 
Cumulative Net Commercial Borrowin2 (In USD billions) 
4.1 0.0 -0.4 2.0 -2.3 0.0 
1.6 2.0 1.8 1.4 0.3 
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook. 
Data for 1987-91 are for the former Czechoslovakia 
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In contrast, equity placements by CEECs in these markets are still 
relatively smaller (Table 5.) 
In CEECs, a variety of feasible exchange rates ranging from pegs to 
floats were put in place reflecting more realistic exchange rates and 
country situations. For example, the Czech Republic adopted a peg to a 
hard currency basket comprising the D-Mark and the US Dollar and, as 
of the beginning of 1996, the authorities allowed for wider fluctuations 
either side of a central value. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak 
Republic have fixed exchange rates vis a vis either a hard currency or a 
basket of hard currencies. Poland and Hungary adopted a crewling band 
both vis a vis a basket of hard currencies. In contrast, Romania and 
Bulgaria use a managed floating and a free floating regime respectively. 
The use of the exchange rates as an anchor has been common among 
CEECs, although with different degrees of effectiveness depending on the 
consistency of the supporting macroeconomic policies. The use of 
exchange rate as an anchor has especially been the case of highly 
dollarized and open economies where monetary policy losses effectiveness 
(Sahay et al. ,1995.) 
A common issue in a number of CEECs is the sometimes difficult balance 
between monetary autonomy, on the one hand, and the use of the 
exchange rate as an anchor for expectations, on the othet". This has been 
particularly the case in the Czech Republic and Poland. In the first 
instance, large capital inflows have complicated monetary management in 
a framework of limited scope for sterilization and a reluctance to let the 
exchange rate appreciate. In this context, the introduction of wider 
bands of fluctuation of up to 7. 5 per cent either side of a centrel value. 
(previously only 0.5 per cent) against the currency basket in February 
1996 was aimed at reducing speculative inflows and easing money supply 
growth. In the case of Poland, pressures from a strong current account 
position complicated monetary control; the introduction of a craw1ingband 
exchange rate system13 in May 1995 was a response to the increasing 
pressure on the exchange rate. 
13 Under the crewling band, the central bank rate is devalued every day by 
a pre-announced rate and an intervention band around the central rate exists. 
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Table 5: International bond and equity issues 
(in million US Dollars) 
INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
CZECH REP. -- -- 694 400 
FORMER CZECHOSLOVAKIA 276 129 -- --
HUNGARY 1.235 1.485 4.801 1. 729 
POLAND -- -- -- --
SLOVAK REP. -- -- 240 275 
INTERNATIONAL EQUITY ISSUES 
CZECH REP. -- -- -- 10 
ESTONIA -- -- -- 7 
HUNGARY 81 21 8 200 
POLAND -- -- I --
SLOVAK REP. -- -- -- --
ROMANIA -- -- -- I 
1995 
(Q,) 
--
--
1. 778 
250 
--
--
--
--
14 
113 
--
Source: Private Market Financing for Developing Countries. IMF, 1995 
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Given the foregoing, it can be argued that a typical sequence of 
exchange rate regimes for CEECs exists. In the initial stage of opening­
up and price liberalization, those countries that had the ability to peg did 
so. This provided an anchor of international prices around which domestic 
prices could converge t at a time when all prices in these economies were 
distorted. In a second stage, the key requirement was to foster 
restructuring, while developing successful stabilization strategies. Then, 
greater flexibility in the exchange rate became necessary. Those 
countries that did not choose to peg their currencies were less successful 
in fighting inflation, furthermore the exchange rate volatility undermined 
the credibility of the domestic currency and encourage the use of parallel 
currencies. 
2.2. Progress on microliberallzation and institutional restructuring of the 
finsncial system 
2.2.1 Break-up of the one tier banldng system: role of banks in the 
transition to a market economy 
The transition from the central planned to the present system of bank 
financing entailed a decentralization of decisions on the volume and price 
of credit aimed at giving market forces a greater role in these decisions. 
Generally, the initial step was the separation of central banking 
operations and creation of a number of commercial banks out of the single 
state bank. Additional efforts were aimed at developing a more efficient 
framework for monetary policy, to provide greater autonomy to the 
central banks, to strengthen operational capacities and competition in the 
banking system, to foster money and securities markets, and to overhaul 
the payments system. Against this backdrop, Hungary established a two 
tier banking system in 1987, Poland in 1989, and Bulgaria, former 
Czechoslovakia, and Romania in 1990. 
However, because the break up of the old monobank was often 
accomplished along the geographic, activity and sectoral lines, there has 
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been little competition among the existing banks. Furthermore, the 
banking system is highly concentrated and this reflects the continued 
dominance of state banks and former state banks in CEECs (with the 
exception of Latvia) (Table 6). In this context, one of the most important 
obstacles to transforming the previously existing banks into authentic 
banking institutions was that, despite the formal separation from the state 
banks, these new commercial banks had inherited the DKMius operandi of 
their communist predecessors. This meant that these new commercial 
banks were not only unsuited to develop a competitive banking system and 
insure the monitoring of corporate performance, but also made them the 
main tool in the state enterprises strategy of resistance to significant 
departures from the status quo. A major step in introducing competition 
in the banking system was the authorization of independent banks, some 
of which, were financed with an important component of foreign capital. 
The transition towards a market economy requires an improvement of 
the allocation of financial resources based on the free and economically 
rational decisions of savers and borrowers. Furthermore, the efficiency 
and effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the ability of banks to 
perform as adequate conveyors of the signals given by monetary 
authorities (Guitian, 1993). And, last but not least, a sound and efficient 
banking system along these lines is also essential In the pursuit of 
structural transformation. 
In order to make the transfer of funds efficient, banks in a market 
economy provide a variety of services such as transformation of 
maturities, diversification of risks and production of information about 
investments. In CEECs, these have been often inefficiently performed 
among other reasons because of the lack of confidence in the banking 
system and the inadequate managerial skills inherited from the centrally 
planned economy. Furthermore, high inflation and negative real interest 
rates have limited the relative size of banks'credits (EBRD, 1995). In 
addition, the dominant share of the outstanding bank credits (with the 
exception of the Baltics and the Czech Republic) is to government and 
state owned enterprises. Against this background, and in parallel to the 
stabilization process, the introduction of banking systems suited for a 
market economy has been a priority of policy makers in these countries 
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Table 6: Number of banks and concentration of 
banking markets (a) 
State Former state Private Tots! 
(privatisedHb) banks 
Czech Republic 
Top banks 4 67 0 '/1 
Top five banks 0 65 0 65 
Hungary 
Top banks 54 8 6 68 
Top five banks 49 8 6 63 
Latvia 
Top banks 6 0 24 30 
Top five banks 6 0 21 27 
Poland 
Top banks 66 5 0 71 
Top five banks 66 0 0 66 
Romania 
Top banks 74 0 5 79 
Top five banks 74 0 0 74 
Slovak Republic 
Top banks 36 40 3 79 
Top five banks 36 40 3 79 
Slovenia 
Top banks 52 37 0 89 
Top five banks 48 22 0 70 
Source I nRD, Transition Report, 1995 
( a) Shares of total b&IIklnq assets held by top b&IIks and top five banks by ownership. 
(b) OWnership elas.irk«tian: A BUlte b&IIk 18 det1necl by atate ownership of at l_lIt 51 per 
cent of shares (direct or indirect). Former state banks are prlvatill8d state b.anluI. 
Private bank. are banks tn.t have never been atate-owned. Fiqur .. in the Uble aA 
shares of total bankinq aal.ta 1n « given country. The Ugure for the top banks 18 the 
BUIII of the •••• t shares of tHInk. with individual •••• t ahare of llIOr8 than 3 per cent. 
The figure for the top five bank. 18 the EI\1III of the tiv8 largest banka, ranked by alnlet 
share. 
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and, consequently, reforms in the area of banking supervision and 
regulation, accounting, and bankruptcy have been tackled. Moreover, 
unsound state banks are being restructured and recapitalized. 
One of the cornerstones of a well functioning payments system is a 
creditworthy banking sector which means that the banks having access 
to these systems are well capitalized and operate in a framework of 
adequate banking supervision. At the same time , countries that developed 
earlier large-value payment systems have more advanced money and 
foreign exchange markets which, in turn, benefit the effective and 
efficient implementation of monetary and exchange policies (Ba1iiio et al. , 
1994) . This has been the case , for example , in Poland where , in 1992, the 
interbank market started to develop and WIBOR (Warsaw interbank 
offered rate) has become the established benchmark for the cost of funds . 
Progress in monetary policy implementation and in the development of 
money markets created a demand for faster and more reliable payments 
systems in the central banks which have played a key role in the 
development of such systems . In this context ,  the improvement of both 
retail and large value systems has been an important objective in the 
overall restructuring of the banking system in CEECs. 
Finally, banks are expected to play many roles in the privatization 
process of state owned enterprises . Firstly, they may be expected to take 
the lead in restructuring state owned enterprises . Secondly, they are 
expected to mobilize domestic and foreign funds and to make them 
available for financing ownership by the private sector and to provide 
working capital as well as investment finance to enterprises after they 
have been privatized . Thirdly, banks can provide advice and other 
specific services (e.g. payment services ) and, last but not least, banks 
can play an important role in the monitoring and control of managerial 
activities . As an example , in Poland , the restructuring of enterprises is 
carried out by banks as part of their own restructuring and 
recapitalization . In this framework , the model of universal banking, most 
conspicuous in CEECs, seems the most suited to play the above mentioned 
roles (Calvo, Kumar et aI . ,  1993) . 
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2.2.2. Main structural problems of tbe banking system: non-performing 
loans and inadequate governance structures 
The origins of the bad losn problem are to be found, although not 
exclusively14, in the monobank structure where credit to state-owned 
enterprises was provided on a book entry basis for all investment projects 
approved under the central plan . Credit was always granted and created 
automatically with the planners' approval . As a consequence, the concept 
of non-performing losn was non existent. Even after initiating the reform 
process and after new commercial banks being launched, the state owned 
enterprises continued receiving credit because state banks did not have 
a clear incentive to maximize profits and, in the absence of adequate 
accounting rules , financial information and credit risk analysis skills ,  
commercial banks granted credit on the basis of insider networks and 
customary relationships .  To complete this picture, the financial needs of 
the state owned enterprises had grown because of the large shocks to 
which these enterprises were subjected in the early 1990s (Bianchard et 
aI .,  1991) as well as because of the problem of interenterprise ciaims· 
which derived largely from arrears to suppliers and accounted for. a 
sizable proportion of enterprises' debt (Rostowski, J .  1994). In this 
context, the practice of rolling over old losns at a higher rate (penalty 
rate) was common, thus eroding the benefit of high inflation for debtors. 
To give an Idea of the size of the bad losn problem, It is worth 
mentioning the case of Hungary where the banking system had non 
performing loans equivalent to 1 7 . 2  percent of total losns (equivalent to 
10 per cent of GDP") in September 1992. At the end of 1991, in Poiand, 
25-60 percent of the portfolio of the seven largest banks was estimated to 
be substandard. And in Bulgaria, nonperforming loans were reported to 
exceed 40 percent of the banks· portfolios in 1993 ( Calvo, Kumar et a1., 
1993). At the end of August 1995, in the Slovak Republic, non standard 
losns amounted to 44 percent of all losns. As of May, 1996, the Bulgarian 
" The deep recession in the early 1990s when the two tier banking systems 
were deviced was also an important factor. 
" Estimated by the World Bank mission of January 27 , 1993. 
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banking system is suffering severe stress , with about 74 percent of its 
assets represented by non-performing loans16 •  
Against this background ,  a moral hazard problem could arise as 
managers of state owned banks have no incentive to lend prudently 
because that is not the basis on which they will be keep their jobs . In 
addition, as long as public banks were saddled with a large proportion of 
non performing assets , they could not be privatized and, hence, effective 
motivation and discipline on management to maximise profits could not be 
imposed. Restructuring was , in most cases , a condition to the 
privatisation because in a large number of cases these institutions were 
insolvent. At the same time, the underdevelopment and fragile state of the 
banking system was also hindering the development and functioning of the 
money and capital markets. 
In response to all these problems, CEECs governments started to take 
measures for the restructuring of the larger state-owned banks . Although 
using different approaches , former Czechoslovakia , Bulgaria, Poland ,  
Slovenia and Hungary took important steps toward banks' recapitalization 
and loan consolidation prior to their privatization (EBRD, 1995 ) .  This, in 
turn , facilitated the change to private ownership . The choice of 
recapitalization method often reflected the trade-off among conflicting 
objectives, in particular the maintenance of financial stability versus 
minimization of fiscal costs . In Hungary , for example, the magnitude of 
the restructuring and recapitalization was one of the largest in the 
region, due in part to the relatively strict bankruptcy law issued in 1992 
and the state-owned banks benefited from several rounds of state­
financed recapitalisation which was criticised mainly on the grounds of 
having helped the banking sector financially in the short term but failed 
to assist the enterprise sector and failed to force the economic decisions 
that would have allowed a quick reallocation of resources to where they 
might have been best used in the case of companies that were not viable. 
16 Financial Times, "Bulgaria forced to bite bullet over reforms", May , 14,  
1996 . 
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In CEECs, not only was the state the sole effective owner of the state 
banks but managers and workers also claimed effective ownership rights 
and took economic and political actions to defend these rights. This 
inherited structure did not favour the necessary restructuring process. 
These insiders, management and labour, had a de facto unsupervised 
control over most decisions concerning state banks' rights and 
obligations. Often, government, management and labour exercised 
influence over state banks assets in their own interests so that their 
claims were conflicting and often overlapping and exercised in a poorly 
defined pattern of property rights. To make things even worse, 
incumbent managers of state banks did not have the necessary strategic 
planning, marketing, and financial skills. 
Some of these problems are also common to the newly created private 
banks, where managers and employees maintain control either via the 
acquisition of shares issued on favourable terms (e.g. price , voting 
power), or via representation on the banks' governing bodies or both. 
Similarly, in the recently privatized banks , the initial ownership 
structure is sometimes the outcome of political compromise to gain the 
support of former managers for privatisation (Fries et aI., 1994). 
Moreover, the state often retains significant residual shareholdings. This 
state of affairs sometimes leads to attempts at chaotic appropriation, the 
diversion of enterprise resources to private and inefficient uses, attempts 
to maximise present wages and employment, banks' decapitalization 
through lack of provisioning and overgenerous dividend distribution, 
etc . .  Therefore, consideration of the appropriate governance structures 
is crucial to the success of the privatization and market oriented financial 
sector in the CEECs. 
2.2.3. Development of law: the banks' prudential policy framework 
In parallel to the creation of a two tier banking system, CEECs 
developed a legal framework where financial institutions and more 
precisely banks started to operate according to market principles. In this 
context, most CEECs enacted legislation on property, contracts, 
companies, anti trust activities and bankruptcy which can de regarded as 
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vital to the banking development (EBRB , 1994 ) .  Furthermore, " basic set 
of prudential regulations along the lines of the Basle Committee or EU 
standards were issued in order to govern the entry, operation, and exit 
of banks. However , implementation and enforcement have been often 
slower, reflecting the need for institutional reforms. More precisely , the 
lack of an appropriate judicial system, an independent supervision and 
the dearth of adequately trained staff (EBRD, 1995) continue to be 
problematic . 
Although specific regulatory practices vary across CEECs, there are 
several broad categories which contribute to ensure banks'soundness. 
These regulations contribute to reinforcing firstly, the operating 
environment (entry barriers , scope of activities ) ;  secondly, internal 
governance ( capital adequacy) ;  and, thirdly , market discipline 
(information disclosures ) (IMF, SM/96/40) . Regarding the first ,  
legislation in most CEECs permits universal banking by allowing direct 
ownership of enterprises by banks , and allows banks to participate in the 
securities market on their own behalf. Hungary is an exception to this and 
legislation separates commercial from investment banks which cannot 
accept deposits .  In CEECs, licensing policies and standards have been 
generally weak mainly because of the limited availability and poor quality 
of information; in addition , the minimum capital was frequently revised 
and often indexed to a hard currency to reflect inflation. 
Regarding internal governance, prudential regulations give guidance 
to the maximum risks that managers can undertake by limiting risks and 
establishing capital standards . Against this backdrop , strict limits on 
credit exposure to a single borrower (or related group) have been 
adopted although the range varies largely17. However J excessive credit 
concentration and insider lending are structural weaknesses of CEECs's 
banking systems because of the high concentration of the banking 
industry as well as the relative large size of the debtors to the country's 
GNP. CEECs have also, adopted the capital adequacy guidelines issued by 
the Basle Committee although in some countries, such as Bulgaria and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics , the requirements have been phased in over 
17 From 20 percent in Romania to 60 percent in Latvia . 
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a fixed period to allow for a more even compliance . Other countries such 
as Latvia have established higher ratios to compensate for inadequate 
provisioning. However, the reliability of the capital ratio depends on a 
good asset classification and provisioning as well as adherence to 
international accounting practices . 
Finally , accounting practices and financial information in CEECs are 
still not aimed at providing market participants with as much information 
to judge the banks I soundness. Nonetheless, significant efforts have been 
made in this regard during the last years with some countries requiring 
external audits of banks according to international accounting standards. 
2.2.4. Development of non bank capital markets 
Capital markets in CEECs have a potentially important role to play in 
the transformation towards a market economy . More precisely , capital 
markets may facilitate the process of privatization ; provide long term 
financing for restructuring and expansion ; provide mechanisms for 
corporate control; provide investors with instruments to diversify their 
portfolios; and encourage savings . However, intermediation via domestic 
capital markets has been limited for the same reasons that constrain the 
maturation of banks . In addition, time is required until households feel 
fully comfortable transferring personal savings from bank deposits to 
stocks or bonds and this further hinders the growth of non bank capital 
markets. However, as income disparities widen, savings are becoming 
more concentrated in a smaller group of households for whom this type of 
investments may seem more enticing ( Schwartz ,  Stone et aI . ,  1993). As 
a matter of fact , all CEECs have launched exchanges where equity and 
debt are negotiated; as of end of 1994, only Lithuania had not developed 
an equity market, and Romania and Estonia had not established a debt 
market (Table 7) . 
Government bond markets were the first capital markets to emerge in 
CEECs . Sales of government bonds directly to the public have resulted in 
a fairly active government securities market , which, in spite of the 
potential crowding out, is institutionally paving the way for corporate 
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Table 7 :  Non bank capital markets in CEEC as of end 1994 
TURN OVER' "  
EQUITY DEBT RATIO (%) 
BULGARIA Y Y 3 . 4  
CZECH REP. Y Y 1 2 . 1  
ESTONIA Y N N/A 
HUNGARY Y Y 21 . 6  
LATVIA Y Y N/A 
LITHUANIA N Y 1 6 . 4  
POLAND Y Y 176 . 7  
ROMANIA Y N N/A 
SLOVAK REP. Y Y 1 1 . 2  
SLOVENIA Y Y 62 . 3  
U . S .  Y Y 69 . 7  
SPAIN Y Y 44 . 1  
GREECE Y Y 3 . 1  
( 1 )  Stock turn over rlltio calculated in local currency ter_ by dividing: llV9rllgtl market 
capitalization tor the year by total value traded. 
Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1995 . lFC 
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bond and equity markets by making investors familiar with the intricacies 
of non bank capital markets (Schwartz, Stone et al. , 1993). By providing 
a relatively safe and homogeneous asset with a range of maturities ,  the 
government is building up investors' experience with trading financial 
assets and, at the same time , facilitating pricing of longer term 
instruments . As a consequence , the bond markets are comparatively 
active and, indeed, the turnover on the Prague , Budapest and Bratislava 
Stock Exchanges Is dominated by trading in bonds. With the exception of 
the Czech Republic and Poland , corporate bonds issues are still rare 
since , in the current inflationary environment, corporations are reluctant 
to issue bonds with yield that would make them attractive to investors ; 
the few that have been issued tend to be privately placed. 
Although activity in the stock markets has increased sharply since 
1994, it is lower compared to the bond market, with the possible exception 
of the Czech Republic where the stockmarket has had its origin in mass 
privatization (Table 8) . In addition , an important part of the securities 
trading involves only a few companies and much of the trading takes place 
over the counter. Against this backdrop, an partly as a consequence , 
markets are extremely volatile. 
The scarce development of the capital markets , the difficulties of 
evaluating risks as well as the scarcity of domestic savings were the 
grounds on which the investment funds were created. These funds were 
intended to play several roles as instruments for: transferring ownership 
to large segments of the population ; exercising corporate control in 
privatized companies (the needed expertise was sometimes contracted out 
to foreign experts) ; and raising funds for the restructuring of privatized 
companies (Blommestein et aI. , 1993). Investment funds have played an 
important role in the privatization programs of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics , Poland and, with less success in Romania. Despite these 
successes , investment funds have been severely criticized ( Kornai , 
1991 18) • 
18 The notion of forming investment funds by state decree to manage private 
property are good illustrations of what Hayek termed a constructivist approach. 
They are artificial creations , whereas the vitality of capitalism development 
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Table 8 :  Number of Listed Domestic Companies (end of period) 
and Market Capitalization (USD millions, end of period) 
NUMBER OF LISTED DOMESTIC COMPANIES (end of period) 
1992 1993 1994 
BULGARIA -- -- 16 
CZECH REP. - - - - 1 . 024 
HUNGARY 23 28 40 
LITUANIA -- - - 13 
POLAND 16 22 44 
SWVAK - - - - 18 
REP. 
GREECE 129 143 216 
SPAIN 399 376 379 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION (USD millions) 
% over 
GDP 
BULGARIA -- -- 0 , 6% 
CZECH REP. - - - - 34 ,6% 
HUNGARY 562 812 3 , 9% 
LITUANIA -- - - 1 , 0% 
POLAND 222 2 . 706 3 , 3% 
SLOVAK - - - - 7 , 9% 
REP. 
GREECE 9 . 489 1 2 . 319 15,5% 
SPAIN 98 . 969 119. 264 31 , 8% 
Source : Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1995. IFC 
International Financial Statistics, IMF, May 1996. 
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52 
1 2 . 589 
1 . 604 
41 
3 . 057 
1 . 093 
14 . 921 
154 . 858 
In parallel to the development of traditional financial instruments ,  
derivative markets were launched by the Budapest Stock Exchange 
(stocks and bonds) and the Bratislava Stock Exchange (stocks) ;  
paradoxically, the last was opened days before the stock exchange 
opened. 
3. CEECs FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND EU INTEGRATION: THE 
CHALLENGES AHEAD 
3 . 1 .  Restructuring and privatization of state-owned banks 
Restructuring is, in most cases , a condition to the privatization of 
banks because of the large size of the non-performing portfolio . 
Furthermore , financial restructuring is necessary not only to prepare a 
bank for private ownership but also to enable state-owned institutions to 
operate on a commercial basis . Two common alternative approaches for the 
resolution of the bad loan problem are either to leave individual banks 
with the responsibility for sorting out the problem ( decentralized 
approach) or to use a specialized agency responsible for administering the 
bad loan portfolio ( centralized approach) .  The first approach has been 
adopted by Poland where non performing loans have been segregated in 
their balance sheets and handed out to special work out departments 
where restructuring agreements are made between the bank and the 
borrower or bankruptcy procedures are initiated. In contrast, Hungary 
and the Czech and Slovak Republics have used the centralized approach 
by which part of the nonperforming loans were transferred to an agency 
created by the government for the purpose of resolving the problem (the 
Spanish Guarantee Fund uses a similar approach) .  
The choice of approach is based on different considerations (Fries and 
Lane, 1994 ) :  the centralized system allows for a relatively easier and 
derives precisely from the fact that its viable institutions arise naturally, without 
being forced . Principles of Privatization in Eastern Europe , Institute for World 
Economics , Hungary , 1991 . 
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quicker valuation of the banks balance sheet that makes it preferable 
when a large proportion of the banking systemts loans are non performing 
( Hungary) ; furthermore, the decentralized approach breaks more easily 
the vicious circle of lending-non paying back-lending again in which 
banks and state-owned enterprises are typically engaged. However , its 
large administrative demands are an important deterrent for adopting this 
type of approach in CEECs. As a matter of fact , successful resolution of 
the non-performing loans have been achieved through both approaches. 
For the banking overhaul to succeed , however, state banks need to be 
recapitalized before being privatized. In parallel, the main source of bank 
losses -the lack of financial discipline in the state-owned enterprises­
should also be tackled. Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak 
Republics have already taken important steps towards banks' 
recapitalization. These capital injections have taken place via issues of 
domestic government bonds. However , additional efforts should be aimed 
at narrowing the interest rate spread between banks' deposits and loans ) 
shifting the burden of reconstituting the banking sector from savers and 
borrowers to the government. As long as the advantages of enhanced 
intermediation exceed the costs associated with interest payments on 
government recapitalization bonds, the entire economy will benefit. 
Moreover , explicit recapitalization via capital injection makes the financial 
cost for the government transparent. However, any kind of 
recapitalization must be a one time only operation in order to avoid a moral 
hazard risk of expectations for government support. Furthermore, state 
banks I restructuring and recapitalization should be conducted as part of 
an appropriate package of macroeconomic adjustment policies. Politically ,  
it remains an important question what degree of soundness must be 
achieved by the aspirants in the process of convergence towards EU. 
Bank restructuring can be considered a pre-condition to privatisation 
or an end in itself". However , risks of political meddling in the banks' 
" Some authors (Blanchard et aI. , 1991) argued that, in CEE C ,  privatization 
must take place before firms are restructured on the grounds that the 
establishment of a clear system of ownership claims was urgent while 
restructuring by necessity had to proceed slowly. They defend , in turn, that 
privatization should take place mostly through distribution rather than through 
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credit allocation will remain as long as they remain state-owned; banks 
can only be expected to operate on a purely market oriented basis if they 
are privatized . Tha� is , by placing private capital at risk, shareholders 
would have an incentive that the risks of investing are appropiately 
measured and priced. At the same time, banks can only enforce market 
behaviour in their customers if they themselves operate in a competitive 
fashion (Blommestein et aI. , 1993) . Against this backdrop, governments 
should be committed to not protect the banks I shareholders since the 
expectation that public assistance will be forthcoming may provide an 
incentive to shareholders, managers and unguaranteed creditors to 
endanger the stability of the bank (Lane, 1993 ) .  Also government should 
make explicit that private capital invested in shares should serve as an 
Initial buffer to absorb losses. 
Against this background, for the privatization to be fully successful, 
it is important to ensure a transparent environment under which banks 
will operate in order to send a clear message to incumbents (shareholders, 
managers and creditors) that they are fully responsible for their 
decisions. This requires, a coherent set of broad parameters on: banks' 
involvement in securities trading; banks' prudential policy ; and 
possibility as well as degree to which bank deposits will be insured (Kyei, 
1995) . 
3 . 2 .  Improving governance of banks 
CEECs face a double task : to create private owners and establish 
arrangements giving these owners and creditors some control over the 
enterprises. Here, the challenge is to create an incentive structure in 
which the interests of the managers, shareholders and creditors can be 
reconciled or the conflicts controlled. Until and unless private enterprises 
are subject to appropriate enterprise control, the benefits of private 
ownership will be modest and in some instances so precarious as to 
jeopardize the independence from the state. Thus, consideration of the 
sales of ownership claims. This has often proved not to be so in the case of the 
banking sector. 
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appropriate governance structure for the newly privatized banks is 
crucial for the success of the market economy in those countries . 
In this context, the debate on governance in CEECs has partly focused 
on the feasibility of alternative approaches to particular institutions of 
enterprise control that would most efficiently encourage and facilitate 
outsider influence. Several mechanisms of corporate finance, not mutually 
exclusive, have been proposed (Phelps , Fryman et a1. , 1993 ) ,  among 
which two deserve our special attention: active financial markets (stocks 
and bonds) and large outside investors . 
Development of liquid secondary markets for shares can facilitate the 
concentration of outside ownership and give outsiders influence over the 
management of the banks . These markets are rapidly developing in CEECs 
particularly in the Czech and Slovak Republics , Poland and Hungary . 
Nonetheless, these secondary markets are not yet very liquid due among 
other reasons to the restrictions either de facto or de jure (as is the case 
in the Czech Republic) on the tradability of shares. It has been argued 
(Coffee, 1991) though , that even if there existed a possibility of 
instituting very liquid stock markets in the short term , it may not 
necessary create the incentives for shareholders to engage in the costly 
process of monitoring and fighting the management trying to defend 
themselves from external interference. Furthermore, reliance on 
takeovers for external monitoring increases job uncertainty of managers 
and this may be particularly dangerous when strong commitment of the 
new owners to restructuring and improvement of corporate performance 
is badly needed in this stage of the transition. 
Debt markets and external financing in general'· may be also an 
important disciplinary mechanism, assuming that the recourse to 
bankrupcy exists. The important role that financial institutions, banks 
and capital markets play in the monitoring and control of corporation 
" Debt mechanisms have been credited with the exceptional performance of the 
German and Japanese corporations today and of the United States during the 
Morgan era at the turn of the century (Hosl, Kashyap et aI. , 1990 and DeLong, 
1992) . 
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managerial activities has been already discussed in sections 2-2-2 and 2-
2-5. In this context ) debt financing may not only limit the scope of 
managers· discretion for fear of bankrupcy but may also impose stronger 
accountability requirements according to international standards. The 
higher degree of enforceability of debt contracts as well as the reduction 
of risks premia in a framework of increasing stability in the CEECs' 
financial markets will allow for a higher degree of leverage and, hence , 
of management diScipline via external financing. 
An important mechanism throughout CEECs aimed at exercising outsider 
influence is that of core investors or large stockholders (at least two in 
order to guard against abuse) .  In this case discipline may be imposed via 
their involvement in the management .  At present , given the lack of 
managerial expertise and , often , of financial resources in CEECs, foreign 
investors seem suitable to play this role . Frequently, foreign investment 
has been accompanied by technical assistance programs which can be 
rather comprehensive ( twinning contracts) .  Foreign participation may 
also facilitate the entry by CEECs banks into foreign markets. 
3.3.  Increasing competitiveness of the f"manciaI system 
In the early stages , when CEECs set about the task of creating a two­
tier banking system, the priority was to ensure stability rather than 
promoting competition. Once the two-tier banking system was launched, 
competition was encouraged by privatizing state owned banks as well as 
readily granting licenses to new and often small banks (both domestic and 
foreign) . The consequence of this strategy was that many banks have 
failed because the rapid changes did not allow for the strengthening of 
the banking system. Nonetheless ,  these failures are part of the maturing 
of hanking systems that have been steadily acquiring breadth as well as 
depth. At the same time , foreign banks are becoming, in some instances , 
a major force in the local and investment market segments. This is posing 
a major competitive threat to domestic banks , and encouraging the 
emergence, through mergers J of a tier of middle"sized local banks as well 
as the creation of alliances with foreign partners . This could also be 
considered as a strategy to cope with the competitive pressures Imposed 
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by a future membership of the EU since, as of today, CEECs banking 
systems are not competitive on 8 EU basis. 
In CEECs, privatization of state owned enterprises has taken place via 
different methods: public offerings of shares; sales of shares to private 
buyers; free distribution of shares (e.g., via vouchers) as well as 
insider privatization. T hese methods all emphasize different financial 
institutions; banks have played and will continue playing an important 
role in the restructuring of enterprises before and after privatization. 
Yet, at the same time, the implementation of most of the above described 
privatization methods created a demand for the creation of a secondary 
market in equity. In turn, the development of an efficient capital market 
complements the development of 8 market-oriented banking system and 
yields important benefits, by mobilizing and channelling savings while 
also reducing the cost of capital. All of which renders important the 
development of banking systems in parallel with capital markets. 
Privatization in a framework of appropriate macroeconomic policy and 
open foreign exchange regime could play a key role in the initial 
development of capital markets. However, further development would 
depend on the development of an appropriate regulatory framework in line 
with international standards, structural market reforms, and the 
broadening of the investor base. 
On the regulatory side, further efforts should be aimed at drafting 
regulations on securities and creating an independent regulatory body 
such as a securities commission where this has not been done so far 
(Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia) or strengthening the existing ones in order 
to Improve the supervision of the markets. These regulations should deal 
with minority shareholders protection (along these lines, the Czech 
authorities have recently drafted regulations) and information 
requirements to be provided by corporations. All of this would improve 
the transparency on the exchanges. On the structural side, improvements 
and modernization of the securities trading systems would enhance the 
reliability of markets, promoting investors confidence, increasing market 
liquidity and facilitating market surveillance. In this context, the 
reliability of clearance and settlement systems are a critical determinant 
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of international investors' willingness to place funds in CEECs' capital 
markets. Very often, in these countries, improvement of settlement 
facilities necessitates the establishment or strengthening of centralized 
depository or registry facilities for securities. 
Further development of hedging instruments and markets, together 
with regulations covering their use, would enhance the liquidity and 
depth of the underlying markets. However, such derivatives can only 
provide the basis for effective hedging if liquid markets for the 
underlying instruments (currencies, government bonds, etc) are in place 
in order to give guidance for prices in the derivative markets. 
Furthermore, their premature introduction may pose a high risk for the 
banking sector if banks are not adept at evaluating the risks involved in 
these operations. 
Deepening of the capital markets in CEECs also requires the broadening 
of the investor base . In this regard, additional liberalization measures 
need to be taken to facilitate foreign investors' access (both individual 
and funds) to domestic markets (e. g . ,  eliminate restrictions on the 
maximum holding on any one company21). Introduction of contractual 
savings schemes would increase the liquidity in local capital markets and 
broaden the range of investment possibilities available to domestic 
investors. So far, the privatization of public sector companies has been 
an important influence on activity in developing equity markets in most of 
these countries and it has provided the dominant source of equity listings 
and trading activity. For example, in the Czech Republic, the second and 
final wave of voucher privatization program was completed in May 1995, 
raising the share of country's gross domestic product generated by the 
private sector to more than 70 per cent22 . Romania's parliament approved 
in 1995 a complex privatization program that aims to sell off, at least 
partly, 3 ,900 medium and large state companies in a coupon scheme. That 
same year, Poland launched its privatization program to sell 400 state 
companies through the issuance of participation certificates in national 
21 Footnote 8 in page 1 1 .  
22 The Banker, February 1996. 
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investment funds to individual citizens and enterprise employees ; and 
Bulgaria approved legislation to provide for privatization vouchers and 
other privatization instruments to be traded on the stock exchange23. 
3.4. Strengthening banks' prudential policy and harmonizing legialation 
Although progress in developing a legal framework to assure contracts 
enforceability and a comprehensive set of banks' prudential regulations 
according to international standards has been significant in CEECs, the 
enforceability of these laws and regulations has evolved at slower pace. 
It reflects weaknesses both institutional and regulatory that have allowed 
a number of banking troubles to emerge . 
In CEECs, banking legislation provides the authorities with 
enforcement powers. In this context, bank supervisors ensure that 
banks' regulations are enforced ; but despite substantial progress, a 
fundamental problem of bank supervision remains its credibility. Several 
are the underlying reasons : on the one hand , the new supervisory bodies 
experience difficulties partly related to the dearth of experienced staff 
and absence of established procedures for off-site and on-site 
supervision. On the other hand , if banks cannot comply with the new 
regulations, perhaps because of the big gap between the original situation 
and the newly required standards ,  supervisors face either regulatory 
forbearance or banks closure. In the first case, deposit insurance may 
further facilitate forbearance by removing pressure from depositors (IMF 
SM/96/40) . In the second case , the threat may not be credible because of 
the large costs associated with it (as In the Latvian banking crisis of 
1995) and/ or the inadequate conservatorship or liquidation procedures . 
Sometimes , political interference may prevent intervention or give rise to 
a conflict of interest . This has been a critical issue in Hungary where a 
large share of the banking system remained in hands of the state. 
The achievement of economic efficiency and banking system stability 
requires that regulatory and supervisory policies enhance, rather than 
" Private Market Financing for Developing Countries, IMF, November 1995. 
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reduce, bank soundness and market discipline ( IMF SM/96/40). This has 
been referred as to market friendly supervision (Padoa Schioppa, 1995) . 
In CEECs, a recurrent problem is the unbridgeable gap between 
regulations and banking conditions which cause regulations to be ignored 
or banks to be forced to adjust in a way that diminishes their role in 
financial intermediation between savers and borrowers (EBRD) 1995) . 
Phased in application of prudential standards inspired in EU Directives 
over a fixed period of time would allow for a smoother adjustment to 
international regulatory standards by banks. Furthermore, higher 
standards , as some countries require , can not compensate for generally 
unstable economic conditions (Nieto et aI . ,  1995). Although international 
regulatory harmonization levels the playing field for competition and, as 
such, it is a condition to EU membership ; it may be unrealistic in CEECs 
in the very short term. 
Finally, the supervisory process has an important role to play in 
establishing confidence. If supervision is not adequate J or if gaps exists 
in it J confidence in the banking system could be undermined and this 
would certainly have a negative effect in attracting private investors . In 
addition , improved banks' financial disclosure will reinforce market 
discipline by providing market participants with as much information to 
judge the banks t soundness . 
4. CONVERGENCE ISSUES 
Full EU membership has become the primary goal for CEECs and to this 
end they have embarked, often with rivalry among themselves ( Richter, 
1996) , on a transformation process by which they are seeking 
endorsement by the international community . In CEECs's view, EU 
membership would provide better opportunities for strengthening 
cooperation with other EU countries, attracting more foreign investors, 
and most importantly, introducing the new members to the strong 
political , legal and economic control imposed by EU institutions .  
Certainly, none of the CEECs economies is yet ready for full membership 
but they have made substantial progress in the last few years , proving 
their adjustment capabilities and transformation dynamics .  
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In the Copenhagen summit in the summer of 1993, a set of criteria were 
formulated in connection with EU enlargement. These criteria include a 
range of political, legal and economic conditions, including the 
stabilization of democracy and law, readiness to adopt the acquis 
comm.unautaire, establishment of an effective market economy, and 
adoption and fulfilment of the convergence aims under the Maastricht 
Treaty . However,  a more careful reading of the Copenhagen criteria seem 
to indicate the EUts interest in concentrating on the economic performance 
of the newcomers (lntoai et aI . ,  1994 ) .  At the same time, it cannot be 
denied that CEECs are in a more complex initial position than earlier 
applicants , mainly for three reasons : first, they are still in a process of 
systemic transformation; second, they are joining in a moment of 
significant changes within the EU ; and third, the depth of EU integration 
is much greater today . But it should also be said that both EU countries 
and CEECs are sharing new trends: somehow similar measures of 
privatization of state enterprises, as well as increased competition in an 
increasingly transparent legal and decision making framework, are also 
prevailing in Western Europe. Such shared trends should favour the 
integration of CEECs. 
4 . 1 .  How far are CEECs from full EU participation? 
Enlargement of the EU to the east raises questions that transcend their 
financial systems, and brings out broader issues such as security, 
foreign policy (especially if the new entrants were to join the EU's 
fledging defense arm) and economic adjustment given the sizable gap 
between the standards of living of CEECs and the existing members 
(Table 9) . The scale of this gap seems to raise doubts about whether 
these economies could cope with the competitive pressures in general 
imposed by the EU's internal market. 
At the present stage , as it has been shown in this paper, CEECs' 
financial sectors are not yet ready to compete on equal footing with those 
of the EU . They have a relatively small size and are rather shallow . As it 
has been said above, their banking systems continue to be largely 
dominated by inefficient state-owned banks (only in the Baltics there has 
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Table 9: Progress in transition! Indicato1'8 
- , 
PQ" cap1t. IIi:wln ot ag:r1c:u1tun 
aa ot 1993 and t�tQ' la gwo 
(in u.sD, at ppp Aa of 199. 
.. tJ._�) I�t pn_) 
Bulgaria 3 . 730 13,a) 
Czech Republic 7 . 700 5 . 5  
Estoola 8. 880 10.5 
Hungary 3 . 979 6 . 6'b) 
Latria 5 . 170 N/A 
Llthwmla 3 . 160 18 
Po ..... d 5.010 7 . 1 (a) (b1 
Ro_ 2.910 21 ,a) 
Slovak Republic 6 .450 8 . 1  
Slovenla 6.490IC) 4 . 5  
E.U. 1 7 . 116 2 ,61-) ld) 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report , 1995 
World Bank, World Development Report . 1995-
OECD, Quarterly National Accounts 
, 
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42 . 3,a) 
39.3 
25 
25.9Ib) 
N/A 
38 
37 . 8Ia) (b) 
41 1a) 
37.5 
35.1 
22 , 3(-) (d) 
Eurostat . National Accounts, detailed tables by sector 
The Banker, Feb 96 
(a) As of 1993 
(b) At constant 1991 prices 
(c) At 1993 USD 
(d) Value added by sector in ' of GDP 
(e) As of 1992 
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-
aprox . 15 
(mid 1995) 
aprox. 70 
(early 1998) 
49 
(mid 1995) 
aprox. 60 
(mid 1995) 
58 
(1994) 
aprox. 60 
(1994) 
58 
(1994) 
35 
(1994) 
aprox . 62 
(mid 1995) 
20 
(1993) 
aprox . 83 
la) ,d) 
been an extensive creation of new private banks) ; furthermore, the pace 
of their privatization has been slow. Also, the scale of lending by banks 
(public and private) is small relative to the size of their economies and the 
dominant share of bank credit in most countries, with the exception of the 
Baltics and the Czech Republic, is to the government and state 
enterprises. In addition, banks' profitability is still very much 
conditioned by the large provi,sions for non-performing assets. On the 
other hand, securities activities are, in general, less developed than 
banking and have been largely shaped by privatization programmes. In 
those countries where mass privatization has taken place (the Czech and 
Slovak Republics) .  the stock market capitalization is high relative to the 
size of their economies; however, liquidity is low compared to their 
capitalization. 
From the viewpoint of the EU countries, the two most sensitive issues 
on the road to full membership are agriculture and financial transfers. 
Both of them are calling for reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy as 
well as the EU financing structure. Furthermore , in the perspective of 
enlargement, EU institutions and procedures would have to be improved 
in order to preserve their capacity for action. At present . all the CEECs 
would be net beneficiaries of the EU's current transfer mechanism. 
Moreover, most but not all would be entitled to funds for agriculture; for 
example, Poland and Hungary are major exporters of agricultural goods, 
while agriculture is not a major negotiation issue for the Czech Republic. 
In addition. all the CEECs in their present situation would be receivers 
of structural and cohesion funds. 
The EU Commission estimates that the CEECs would receive significant 
amounts of regional aid as a percentage of these countries' GNP. In fact , 
this has raised questions about the recipient countries' ability to put this 
financing to good use". In order to tackle this problem. the EU 
Commission has proposed setting a ceiling defined as a percentage over 
GNP on the structural funds that existing countries and future members 
24 Based on the experience of the Phare aide program, CEEC have encountered 
difficulties in finding suitable projects to fund , even though the resources were 
only a small fraction of the regional aid estimated. 
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can receive. The Commission has also argued that extending the Common 
Agricultural Policy to CEECs could trigger a rise in their food prices ; to 
tackle this problem, lengthy transition periods lasting between seven and 
ten years are being recommended. 
From all the above, it can be concluded that the transition from the 
present association agreements to full membership may take a long time. 
It also seems clear that EU enlargement to the east) when it takes place, 
cannot be but gradual because of the different development levels of the 
potential member countries and of the potentially high costs involved in 
entry of individual countries. Even so, the issue of the EU enlargement 
towards the east may lead some to advocate a multi-track approach to 
European integration. That is, a more flexible Union which would still 
preserve cohesion among its members. 
4 . 2 .  How far are CEECs from full EMU participation? 
According to the present calendar, the EU will move to a single 
currency by January I ,  1999. Hence, it seems most likely that EMU would 
be already in place by the time of EU enlargement to the east. In this 
context , there are two fundamental issues to be considered: the first is 
whether the CEECs need to be members of the EU before entering into any 
exchange arrangement with EMU members. The experience so far with the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) is that only members of the EU have fully 
participated in the ERM. As a precedent, it is worth mentioning the case 
of Sweden whose request for membership in the ERM before joining the EU 
was denied . Furthermore, the Treaty provisions as of today do not 
contemplate any other possibility than membership in the EU before 
entering into the ERM. 
The second issue centers on the ability of CEECs (all or some) to join 
EMU once they have joined the EU. This is, whether their economies are 
ready to absorb shocks of domestic (i . e .  wage shocks) or foreign (i . e .  
more competitive neighhors) origin caused by their integration into the 
EU economy; and whether they will have the capacity to fulfil the 
convergence criteria. Both, in light of what has been discussed in this 
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paper, seem most unlikely . Furthermore, CEECs are at present far from 
being part of an optimal currency area with the EU. 
Assuming that CEECs will not be in a position to participate fully in 
EMU from its beginning. it is difficult to predict whether they would 
wish25 and/or be able to enter any new monetary relationship between 
the participant and non-participant member states in the third stage of 
EMU (so called ERM2) .  It will very much gepend on how that relationship 
is defined26• In case that they are both able and willing, as other 
member states that do not irrevocably fix their exchange rates at the start 
of the stage three , CEECs (all or some) will be involved in the processes 
of co-ordination of economic policies with countries fully participating in 
EMU. This implies, firstly, the establishment of close monetary relations 
with countries fully participating in EMU as well as the treatment of the 
exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest27 and; secondly , the 
participation in EMU institutions (General Council of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) ) .  However. the CEECs will be excluded from the appointment 
of members to the executive board of the ECB and from participation in 
the governing council of the Bank. They will also be excluded from 
decisions on financial matters such as the pooling of reserves at the ECB 
and the allocation of seigniorage. 
In the policy making context, close monetary relations imply that 
CEECs will need to address institutional changes such as central bank 
independence and the adoption of price stability objectives although these 
countries still can maintain autonomous monetary policy. The scope of 
these close monetary relations can be broadened to include the 
development of a sound market oriented financial sector along the lines 
described in this paper. This encompasses: firstly . dealing with the 
inherited weaknesses of the banking system ; secondly , increasing 
competitiveness of the financial system ; and thirdly, strengthening 
25 Although the widest possible membership of the new arrangement would be 
clearly desirable, participation should probably be on a voluntary basis . 
26 At present, this issue is under discussion. 
27 Article l09m of the Treaty of Maastrich. 
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institutions and rules which ensure soundness of the financial system. 
All of this, in turn, will increase the efficiency of monetary policy. 
Coordination of economic policies also implies that CEECs as non 
participant members in the third stage of EMU should treat their exchange 
rate policy as a matter of common interest and may have to enter into some 
sort of exchange arrangement with other EU countries which do take part 
in the planned EMU . It is uncertain how this arrangement will be since 
definitive decisions on the issue do not need to be reached before 1998. 
Any hypothesis for a new exchange regime would , at this stage , be 
conceptual in nature . However, it can be argued that the tighter the 
relation (the narrower the band) between the Euro and currencies 
outside", the more problematic it will be for CEECs to move early 
towards the new exchange rate mechanism (ERM2 ) . It remains to be 
discussed whether the band-width should be subject to particular 
arrangements . 
Despite the success of nominal anchoring strategies (such as the Czech 
experience in bringing down inflation to single digits) ,  this strategy does 
not suffice to achieve price stability in the longer run. To meet that 
objective requires a direct attack on the domestic sources of inflation and 
this means that monetary policy has to develop both the instruments and 
the credibility to influence inflation through domestic transmission 
channels . In this context, fiscal and other macroeconomic policies must be 
consistent with domestic price stability; that is, to provide the freedom 
that monetary policy needs to be effective. At present , CEECs are still ID 
the process of institutionally strengthening their instruments to fight 
inflation. At the same time , there are some slippages from earlier 
consolidation, especially in the case of Bulgaria , Hungary and, to a lesser 
extent, Romania which threaten to erupt into credibility crises . 
" Along the lines made in the proposal of a remodelled ERM (ERM2) where the 
Euro will be at the center and where the new system would be more asymetrical 
than the existing EMS, meaning that policy adjustments to stabilise currencies 
must primarily be undertaken by non participants in EMU . 
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Furthermore, as discussed before in section 2 .. 1 J one of the main 
challenges associated with successful stabilization and the related 
credibility improvement is that of capital inflows . To deal with them In the 
context of a fixed exchange rates and without introducing any sort of 
restriction on capital flows is an extremely difficult task, as the recent 
Czech experience has proved. The introduction of some degree of 
exchange rate uncertainty in both directions can be expected to reduce 
the scale of speculative capital flows and, hence, make monetary 
management somewhat easier . A switch to more flexible exchange rates 
arrangements may help a country to succeed in conquering inflation 
without loosing competitiveness in the international markets . As shown 
before , inflation rates are still stubbornly high in most CEECs. With fixed 
exchange rates, their currencies would gradually appreciate in real 
terms. But more flexible arrangements such as band fluctuation, 
especially one of the crawling variety, allow the authorities to act against 
this through a controlled depreciation of its currency's exchange rate. 
Last, but not least, there is a credibility issue ( Dornbush, 1991 ) :  fixing 
an exchange rate may not be po'ssible if domestic agents believe that the 
policy will be abandoned if the costs of maintaining it are too high. Some 
other arguments (CEPR, 1990 and Davenport , 1992) could also be used to 
sustain that it is still too soon for CEECs , even for those more advanced 
in the process of stabilization, to lose autonomy in the management of 
exchange rate policy , but this subject is beyond the scope of this paper . 
5 .  CONCLUSIONS 
The prospect of eventual EU membership of the CEECs was made 
explicit in 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council if and 
when certain basic political and economic criteria are fulfilled . The Essen 
Summit in December 1994 and the Madrid Summit in December 1995 were 
already taking future enlargement eastward of the EU into account; in 
this new context , the question had become when and how , rather than 
whether, the CEECs would achieve EU membership . However, CEECs are 
in a more complex initial position than earlier applicants , mainly for three 
reasons : first, they are still in a process of systemic transformation ;  
- 50 -
second, they are joining in a moment of significant changes within the EU; 
and third, the depth of EU integration is much greater today . 
Although enlargement of the EU towards the east raises questions that 
transcend their financial systems; CEECs, in their goal of becoming EU 
members , are aiming to establishing closer monetary relations with EU 
countries . The scope of these close monetary relations can be broadened 
to include the development of a sound market oriented financial sector. 
This encompasses: firstly , dealing with the inherited weaknesses of the 
banking system; secondly, increasing competitiveness of the financial 
system; and thirdly , strengthening institutions and rules which ensure 
soundness of the financial system . 
Two main weaknesses of the banking system have been referred to in 
this paper: the large proportion of non-performing loans in the banks 
portfolios ; and their inadequate governance structures. The 
restructuring of the non performing loans is a daunting task given the 
size of the overhang but it is essential to achieve soundness. This, in 
turn, will enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism .  However, any kind of recapitalization should be a one time 
only operation in order to avoid a moral hazard risk of expectations for 
government support . Politically, it remains an important and open 
question how sound the CEECs financial systems need to be before they 
are found acceptable by the EU. Appropriate enterprise control is a 
condition to ensure independence from the state and assure the full 
benefits of private ownership . Given the scarce development of efficient 
capital markets (stocks and debt) , market oriented foreign investors may 
facilitate financial discipline , but the interest of various stockholders 
(managers, workers and shareholders) must often still be reconciled. 
A less politically complex task is to create the proper environment for 
a new transformed financial system: efficient banks and capital markets. 
In this context, increase competitiveness of the banking system has been 
achieved through privatization and licensing of new banks both domestic 
and foreign . Often, rapid changes in the economic environment and in the 
institutional setting did not allow for the strengthening of the banking 
system and bank failures have been common . However, these failures are 
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part of the maturing of these institutions. At the same time, foreign banks 
are posing a major competitive threat to domestic banks , and encouraging 
the emergence , through mergers , of a tier of middle-sized local banks as 
well as the creation of alliances with foreign partners . However, as of 
today , CEECs banking systems are not competitive on a EU basis . 
Similarly, the privatization of state-owned enterprises created a demand 
for the development of an efficient secondary market in equities which, 
in turn, complements the development of a market oriented banking 
system. This yields important benefits by mobilizing and channelling 
savings while also reducing the cost of capital of market institutions. All 
of these factors render important the development of banking systems in 
parallel with capital markets. Notwithstanding, further development of 
the capital markets depends on the development of an appropriate 
regulatory framework; the implementation of structural reforms, and the 
broadening of the investor base. The later implies that additional 
liberalization measures need to be taken to facilitate foreign investors' 
access. 
Although a regulatory framework of banks which provides the 
authorities with enforcement powers according to international standards 
has been enacted in all the CEECs; its uneven enforceability has 
demonstrated institutional and regulatory weaknesses. In CEECs, the 
achievement of economic efficiency and banking system stability requires 
that regulatory and supervisory policies enhance bank soundness and 
market discipline . Phased in implementation of prudential standards 
inspired in EU Directives over a fixed period of time would allow for a 
smoother adjustment by banks to international regulatory standards . 
Furthermore , higher standards, as some countries require , can not 
compensate for generally unstable economic conditions. Although 
international regulatory harmonization levels the playing field for 
competition and, as such, it is a condition to EU membership ; it may be 
unrealistic in CEECs in the very short term. 
These reforms, some of which (the institutional ones) are by their own 
nature of very gradual implementation , are to be accomplished within the 
framework of fiscal consolidation, monetary stability and exchange rate 
stabilization . Although progress has been significant in these areas in 
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some countries ( Poland , the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Slovenia) ,  
two key areas of pressure on fiscal and monetary prudence exist : 
substantial overhang of banking sector liquidity problems and incomplete 
transformation of inherited social programs . It is also still too soon even 
for those countries more advanced in the process of stabilization to lose 
autonomy in the management of exchange rate policy. Some degree of 
exchange rate flexibility is required to reduce the scale of speculative 
capital flows associated with successful stabilization and, hence, make 
monetary management somewhat easier without imposing any restriction 
on capital flows . Furthermore , flexible exchange rate arrangements may 
help a country to succeed in fighting inflation without loosing 
competitiveness in the international markets when inflation rates are still 
stubbornly high. 
Against this background, it can be concluded that the transition from 
the present association agreements to full membership may take a long 
time. Also, it seems clear that EU enlargement to the east, when it takes 
place, cannot be but gradual because of the different development levels 
of the potential member countries and of the potentially high costs 
involved in entry of individual countries. Even so, the issue of the EU 
enlargement towards the east may lead some to advocate a multi-track 
approach to European integration. That is, a more flexible Union which 
would still preserve cohesion among its members . 
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